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Introduction
In practice, compensation schemes based on accounting information play an important role in bringing managers into line with shareholders´ objectives. 1 In particular, residual income (e.g. EVA TM ) has received a great deal of attention. 2 For calculating residual income many firms start with accounting i ncome under generally accepted accounting rules and subsequently make adjustments for performance measurement purposes. This performance measure is closely related to the firm´s market value of equity if earnings are measured in accordance with the clean surplus principle. See, e.g., PREINREICH [1937] , PEASNELL [1982] , OHLSON [1995] .
-2 -situations in which a manager has to make an investment decision between mutually exclusive investment projects.
This paper will study a setting in which residual income should be able to induce a correct project selection. I will examine a multiperiod principal-agent model in which a capital investment decision is delegated to a better informed agent. Before obtaining access to profitable investment opportunities the manager has to exert research effort at his own expense. The principal implements an incentive scheme based on accounting information in order to motivate effort and managerial investment decisions that maximize firm value.
If the available investment projects are mutually exclusive, the agent will maximize firm value if he adopts the project with the highest net present value (NPV). When compensating the agent based on accounting information, income smoothing generates residual earnings that correctly reflect the ranking of various investment opportunities. 4 Due to his research effort, the agent is better informed about the NPV of the investment projects than the principal. Yet, an accounting system provides the principal with i nformation about individual cash flows of each investment project adopted by the agent.
Observing noisy cash flow signals, the principal updates his prior beliefs about the NPV. Annuitizing the conditional mean of the NPV generates a smoothed stream of residual earnings.
The paper will show that the more signals the principal observes, the better the capability of residual earnings to reflect the ranking of investment projects. Thus, the information contained in the cash flow signals is beneficial to the principal and would lead 4 EGGINTON [1995] shows that representing residual earnings as the annuity of the NPV at each date leads to a periodic consistency of earnings and NPV which induces a manager to maintain the ranking of mutually exclusive investment projects.
him to compensate the agent as late as possible. However, shifting compensation payments to the future is costly to the principal if the manager is short-sighted and has a discount factor that exceeds the firm´s cost of capital. If an impatient manager is paid for his personal effort costs at a late point in time, he will demand a premium for late compensation. I will show that income smoothing leads to a trade-off between agency costs resulting from differences in discount rates and the benefits associated with the information contained in noisy cash flow signals.
Contribution to existing literature
This analysis builds on prior literature examining the potential of residual income in providing managerial investment incentives in multiperiod settings. Part of this earlier work shows that residual income can provide optimal investment incentives when the manager´s time preference is unknown to the principal. 5 These studies analyze goalcongruent performance measures which induce an agent to accept only positive NPV projects, or to determine the optimal level of investment. Some of these papers find residual income to be an optimal measure of performance if additional information about the growth rate of future cash flows is available to the principal. This information is used to construct a depreciation schedule that represents residual earnings as a positive constant of the NPV at each and every date. This allocation scheme is called "relative benefit depreciation schedule" (RBD schedule). Consider, e.g., two projects A and B that are mutually exclusive. They are given by the cash flowtuples A = (-100;+10;+20;+150) and B = (-100;+125;+20;+10). At the firm´s cost of capital of 10 % the principal prefers A. Matching the cash investment of -100 and the interest costs according to the RBD scheme generates residual earnings for A of (0;+2.77;+5.54;+41.55) and for B of (0;+34.83;+5.54;+2.77). If compensation payments are strictly increasing in the performance measure, the agent seeks to maximize the present value of future residual earnings. If the agent´s discount rate is 20 % (or higher), the manager will prefer project B.
-5 -that of the principal, then agency costs vary depending on when the manager is compen- at a late point in time generates additional agency costs but no benefits, I will show that late cash compensation can enhance the effectiveness of providing managerial investment i ncentives. The paper discusses a trade-off between the agency costs resulting from differences in discount rates and the efficiency in providing managerial investment incentives.
-6 -The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 characterizes possible accounting rules that provide perfect incentives in a first best-scenario. Section 5 studies the comparative statics of these accounting rules in a second best-scenario in which principal and agent have asymmetric information. Section 7 concludes the study.
The Basic Model
In 0 = t a principal offers a contract to a manager (agent). The contract is designed to hire the manager for T periods which exactly cover the agent´s planning horizon. In oder to obtain access to profitable investment opportunities the agent has to exert re-
. Managerial effort can be interpreted as a personal investment in firm-specific human capital. Upon recognizing the currently available investment projects, the agent has to decide which project to accept, if any. The investment decision is delegated to the agent because he has superior knowledge about the profitability of the investment projects. Due to exogenous constraints such as capital, time or capacity restrictions the manager can only realize one project each period. This requires the agent to establish a ranking of mutually exclusive investment projects. The principal would like the manager to accept the project with the highest NPV.
In order to gain access to profitable investment opportunities, the agent has to exert By exerting effort, the agent independently draws a sample of investment opportunities from a time-invariant distribution. Out of this sample the agent should be able to realize the i nvestment project with the highest NPV. This means that each period the agent selects one project out of the same distribution of investment projects. The current investment decision is assumed to have no impact on the set of future investment opportunities. The ex ante probability that the agent will detect profitable investment oppor-
. The expected value of the ex ante probability distribution is assumed to be
. With a probability of . Since the last investment decision is made at date n T − , the principal may want the manager to take outside employment opportunities starting at date 1 + − n T , -8 -while the incentive scheme holds the agent responsible for his investment decisions by receiving deferred cash compensation for the last n dates. Thus, the planning horizons of principal and agent are identical and comprise a space of time from
At the beginning of each period the principal provides the agent with capital to finance the accepted investment project. It is assumed that the principal provides the agent with a fixed capital budget. Capital rationing requires the agent to make an i nvestment decision between mutually exclusive profitable investment projects, i.e., out of two investment projects with identical cash investments the manager will be motivated to select the project with the highest NPV. Table I illustrates the sequence of events between two representative points of time. In order to motivate the agent to expend research effort and to make good investment decisions, the principal implements an incentive system that consists of a sharing rule s and some performance measure Π . Wage payments t w are given by
The performance measure in (1) can be based on various intertemporally overlapping investment projects so that
if the agent has accepted a project in period i, and 0
denotes the agent´s wealth constraints. This implies that the agent´s aggregate wage is restricted to positive -9 -compensation payments. The fixed wage t s is crucially determined by the agent´s participation constraint. In order to retain the agent against competitive employment opportunities, the principal has to consider the agent´s market alternatives by at least providing him with his reservation utility:
The agent is risk neutral and seeks to maximize the present value of future compensation payments net of effort costs:
The variable t A γ represents the agent´s discount factor with
can be motivated to exert effort only if the present value of future cash payments associated with his effort choice is able to compensate his personal effort costs. At each date, the principal has to consider the agent´s incentive compatibility constraint which is given by
(IC)
The principal is assumed to be risk ne utral, as well. In this case, maximizing individual utility corresponds with maximizing firm value. Thus, the agent acts in accordance with the principal´s objective if he realizes the investment project with the highest NPV.
The principal´s utility function is given by: . Differences in discount rates can be attributed to imperfections that cause the manager´s borrowing and lending opportunities to be inferior to those available to the principal. This is frequently considered to be a realistic assumption, since capital markets prefer lending to a firm with deeper pockets and more extensive financial reporting requirements. 8 Due to these imperfections there are no infinitely large private banking activities between princ ipal and agent.
"First best-incentives" under symmetric information
The RBD schedule does not induce a manager to accept the project with the highest NPV, because these accounting rules represent residual earnings as a time-variant constant of the NPV, depending on the growth rate of cash flows. In order to motivate a short-sighted manager to accept the most profitable project, residual income can be represented as a time-invariant constant (e.g. the annuity) of the NPV in each period. In this case, the agent receives the highest compensation payments in each period if he realizes the most profitable investment project. The special role of this particular periodic consistency of residual income and NPV has been studied in EGGINTON [1995] . Representing residual earnings as a time-invariant constant of the NPV enables residual earnings to reflect the NPV rankings of mutually exclusive projects. 
It can easily be verified that the depreciation charge ti d is "complete" since the present value of the allocated investment costs equal the initial investment outlay 0 t B . The depreciation schedule ti d ge nerates residual earnings that represent a time-invariant constant of the NPV. Therefore, residual income coincides with the annuity of the NPV:
Under this accounting rule the project with the highest NPV generates the highest performance measure in each and every period. If compensation payments are strictly increasing in the performance measure, the agent will be motivated to accept the most profitable project at all dates independently of his time preference. 9 This depreciation schedule generates residual earnings which are identical at all dates for projects of equal profitability. Consequently, both principal and agent are indifferent between projects of equal profitability. Yet, this solution requires the principal to be as well informed about the profitability of the investment opportunity as the agent. In this respect, the analysis of this section can be regarded as a first best-case in which principal and agent have 9 Note, that the depreciation schedule ti d generates efficient incentives for project selection without having to restrict the domain of available projects to the class of investment opportunities with only positive cash inflows in n i ,..., 1 = .
-12 -symmetric information about the project´s NPV. 10 This benchmark can never be attained by taking asymmetric information into consideration.
Nevertheless, assume that the agent is compensated based on the performance measure in (5) which provides perfect investment incentives in each period. For each adopted project the principal seeks to maximize the ex ante expected NPV net of compensation payments subject to the constraints of incentive compatibility and particip ation:
subject to (IC) and (PC). In order to solve for the motivation problem, the principal can choose a bonus coefficient of:
Solving the princ ipal´s problem in (6) leads to the following results:
12
Proposition 1: Assume that a performance measure Π provides efficient investment incentives in each and every period n i ,...,
compensating the agent in all periods n i ,..., 1 = based on Π generates higher agency costs than a single compensation amount in 1 = i .
In order to hold the impatient manager at his minimum utility level, cash compensation has to be the higher, the later the manager is compensated. For
cash compensation to the future has wealth effects, since the agent charges a premium 10 In principle, the provision of investment incentives is immaterial under symmetric information. The analysis in section 5 below studies the implementation and the comparative statics of income smoothing when the principal is less informed about the profitability of the available investment opportunities. 11 An agent whose actual discount factor exceeds the lower bound i A γ will earn rents, which result from deferring cash compensations to the future at a higher interest rate. However, due to the performance measure in (5) the incentive scheme induces an optimal project selection. 12 All proofs appear in the appendix. 
The income smoothing-solution in a second best-scenario
In this section, I will analyse the properties of smoothed residual earnings to provide investment incentives in a setting in which principal and agent have asymmetric information. I will first provide a description of the information asymmetry between principal and agent. Afterwards, I will analyze the comparative statics of the income smoothingsolution. It is assumed that communication between principal and agent about private informatio n of the latter is blocked. 13 Since the agent is better informed about the profitability of the investment project, the principal delegates the investment decision to the agent. 
Representation of asymmetric information and Bayesian updating
I assume that the principal has implemented an accounting system that provides him with information about realized cash flows. 
Income smoothing and providing investment incentives
Since the principal is not properly informed about the NPV, smoothed residual earnings can only be expressed as the annuitized conditional mean of the NPV. Provided that all fixed wages are zero, the agent receives compensation payments based on 
Proposition 2 shows that the weight of prior informa tion in the performance measure gradually decreases in the course of time, i.e., the congruity of the performance measure depends on -the informativeness of the signals:
-the number of signals observed by the principal:
It can easily be verified that 0 ) ,
and n i = . The lack of congruity generates additional costs in terms of inducing sub-optimal managerial investment decisions. These costs are denoted )) ,
. The lack of congruity induces the agent to deviate from the optimal investment strategy. By normalizing the agent´s reservation utility to zero the principal´s problem is: 
In line with previous findings, proposition 3 shows that agency costs increase in the course of time due to the differences in discount rates. The second term in (11) shows that compensating the agent at date i t + for his effort costs incurred in t is more expensive than rewarding him in period 1 − + i t . In order to hold the agent at his minimum utility level, cash compensations have to increase in the course of time. This component would induce the principal to reward the agent as early as possible. If the principal is less informed about the NPV of the realized project, the increase in agency costs resulting from the agent´s impatience can be traded against the benefits resulting from the first term in (11). Proposition 3 shows that a compensation in late periods also brings -19 -about some benefits. Revising prior beliefs based on the signals observed at date i t + reduces the costs associated with the lack of congruity.
Corollary: Assume that the agent is compensated based on * ti RI for his effort t e . In each period n i ,..., 1 = such a compensation generates a trade-off between the agency costs associated with the agent´s time preference premium and the costs due to the lack of congruity. This trade-off can be expressed as ( )
The trade-off between agency costs resulting from differences in discount rates and the costs depending on the congruity of the performance measure can be described by the variation of agency costs with respect to time. Whereas a compensation at date 1 = i is rather cheap with respect to the agent´s time preference premium, the congruity of the performance measure is rather low at that date ( ) 1 , ( = i N ß is relatively high). However, at date n i = the weight of the cash flow signals in the performance measure is relatively high, so that the provision of efficient investment incentives is rather probable
is relatively low). Yet, at date n i = the agency costs resulting from the agent´s impatience are relatively high. The enhancing congruity of the performance measure can be regarded as a counterpart to the increase in agency costs resulting from differences in discount rates. However, due to the benefits resulting from an enhanced incentive provisioning my results show that a compensation based on the principal´s problem in (6) leads to
In the second best-scenario it is
In this case, the principal can choose a bonus coefficient of
in order to solve the motivation problem. An agent with a time preference of i A γ can realize rents. Substituting (13), (IC) and (PC) into (6) yields 
Recollecting terms and setting
This leads to
The agency costs are 
The claim in Proposition 1 is true iff the expression in (14) holds by strict inequality in at least one period i t + and by equality in all other periods n i ,..., 1 = : 
S S S
Substituting (19) and (20) into (17) 
Following equation (7) 
